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T HE 51st Legislature of the State of Texas in 1949 passed an act
detailing comprehensive regulation of the writing and solicita-
tion of credit life insurance and credit health insurance in connec-
tion with loans of money not exceeding $1,000.00. This act, which
will be referred to throughout this article as the "Credit Insurance
Act," is now Article 3.53 of the Insurance Code.1 The emergency
clause reads as follows:
The facts that many thousands of Texas citizens who are borrowers
of moderate sums of money are now required by many lenders as a
condition for making the loans that the borrower purchase from the
lender policies of life insurance and health and accident insurance; that
the premium rates charged in many cases are exorbitant and bear
no reasonable relation to benefits provided by such policies; that in
many cases the policies so purchased are never delivered to the insured
borrowers; that frequently such borrowers never know that they are
entitled to any insurance protection notwithstanding the premiums
for such insurance have been included in the amount of their loans;
that there is no such general law prohibiting coercion of insurance
and preserving to each citizen the right to choose his own insurers
and insurance agent; that there is no general law prescribing for the
regulation of the sale of such insurance and providing for the protec-
tion of Texas citizens from such unscrupulous practices, create an
emergency and an imperative public necessity that the Constitutional
Rule requiring bills to be read on three consecutive days in each House
shall be, and said Rule is hereby suspended, and this Act shall take
effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted."
The Credit Insurance Act in its various sections sets up in detail
the scope of regulations to be administered by the Board of In-
surance Commissioners for the purpose of eliminating the abuses,
coercion and unscrupulous practices described in the emergency
clause. No question is raised in this article as to the constitutionality
of any of the sections of the Credit Insurance Act designed to pro-
1"This article is the first of a series of articles considering Texas laws pertaining to the
regulation of the loan and consumer finance business.
* A.B., University of Akron; LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Professor of Law
and Director of Moot Court Activities, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 TEx. INs. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1956).
'Texas Acts 51st. Leg., 1949, c. 81, §17.
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tect Texas citizens as set out in the emergency clause. But there is
one section of the Credit Insurance Act that does not lend itself
to the protection of Texas citizens. That section is Section 6, which
is worded as follows:
Commissions received by lenders, lender agents and insurance agents
from insurers for the writing of credit insurance complying with the
terms of this Act, the maximum rates promulgated by the Board,
and rules and regulations of the Board of Insurance Commissioners,
shall be considered for all purposes as compensation for services ren-
dered to such insurer and shall not be taken to be an interest charge
on the money borrowed; provided, however, should such commissions
be in excess of any maximum fixed hereunder, then such commissions
shall be deemed to be an interest charge on the money borrowed. No
agreements by insurers with any of its agents shall permit contingent
commissions based on loss experience.3
It is the thesis of the writer that this section permits "legalized
usury" in the sense that as long as small loan lenders comply with
the other sections of the Credit Insurance Act, they remain immune
from the usury laws under Section 6 even though said lenders in
fact and intent are committing usury. This situation will prevail
as long as Section 6 remains unchallenged as to its constitutionality."
The purpose of this article is to reveal Section 6 as unconstitutional.
SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
This article deals with only one very important aspect of the
tremendous small loan problem in Texas. It deals specifically with
the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Credit Insurance Act. It does
not go into any of the many other aspects of our unregulated small
loan situation.'
3 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, §6 (Supp. 1956).
4A subsequent article will consider in detail the case of Hatridge v. Home Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), which held the Credit In-
surance Act constitutional on "stipulated" facts that did not really raise the issue of
its constitutionality.
'Texas has been labeled too many times for it to be coincidental, as the leading loan
shark state. See the pamphlet STOP BRAGGING TEXAS compiled under auspices of State
Junior Bar of Texas in 1952. Also Morehead, Loan Shark State, Dallas Morning News,
9-article series, April 11-19, 1952. Operation under the Texas Credit Insurance Act
apparently has had no effect on Texas leadership in this field. See WESTERN RESERVE
UNIVERSITY BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, SMALL LOAN LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
13 (11th ed. 1955); Mors, Small Loan Laws and Credit Insurance, 1954 INS. L. J. 784;
Chrisby, Credit Life, Health and Accident Insurance and the Small Loan Industry in
Indiana, 1954 INs. L. J. 466. See also Morehead, Drive Starts for Legislation to Curb
State's Loan Sharks, Dallas Morning News, Dec. 21, 1956, §1, p. 17, where it is re-
ported that Morris Brownlee, Commissioner of Insurance, called for legislation to stop
the tie-in of insurance sales with loans and financing because that practice had cost
Texans "millions of dollars." See also STATE BAR OF TEXAS, REPORT OF SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON SMALL LOAN LAWS (July 3, 1952).
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This article does not deal with the many facets opened by the
passage of the Credit Insurance Act. It does not deal with the nu-
merous abuses of the borrower by the lender under this Act." It
does not deal with the widespread belief that the Credit Insurance
Act has led to the almost universal tie-in of credit insurance sales
with small loans as a cloak for usury.7 It does not deal with statistics
indicating flagrant abuses and violations of the Credit Insurance
Act.' It does not deal with the void existing with respect to policing
of lenders operating under the Act.! It does not consider the merits
or demerits of credit insurance itself or its use in the small loan and
consumer financing field.1"
This article will not consider constitutional questions of usurious
interest that might be raised by statutes concerned with banks,1
6 A reading of the statements recorded in the Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing
on Credit Insurance before the Board of Insurance Commissions, Austin, Texas, April 3,
1956, indicates that after seven years under the Credit Insurance Act, the abuses are
greater than ever and that none of the purposes of the Act a's set out in the emer-
gency clause of the Act have been achieved. For some specific examples where the abuses
have been proved see jury findings in Harned v. E. Z. Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254
S.W.2d 81 (1953); Duty v. General Finance Co., 159 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954);
See also Industrial Finance Service Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error granted; Advance Loan Service v. Mandik, No. 78519-C, 68th District Court, Dallas
(now pending appeal). See also MAJOR MILTON W. SWETT, JR., OPERATION OF THE LOAN
SHARK CREDIT INSURANCE RACKET AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL IN TEXAS (1955), a
brochure distributed to military commanders in Texas. See also testimony of James Dan-
heim, Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Austin, Texas,
Sept. 4, 1951, p. 41-45. See statements of various Texas leaders quoted in article
Credit Insurance and the Money Lenders, The Texas Observer, Jan. 25, 1956.
'Ibid. See also Commisioner Brownlee's statement quoted note S supra.
' See Testimony, Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Board
of Insurance Commissioners, Austin, Texas, April 3, 1956, pp. 10 to 54. See also authori-
ties cited note 6 supra. Also Texas Finance & Thrift Agsn. v. State, 224 S.W.2d 522
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Ware v. Wright, 266 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
'See STATE BAR OF TEXAS, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SMALL LOAN LAWS
3 (July 3, 1952); remarks of former Chairman of Board of Insurance Commissioners,
George Butler, Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Austin,
Texas, Sept. 4, 1951, p. 2. See also Morehead, Credit Insurance Will Get Review, Dallas
Morning News, Feb. 2, 1956: " . . . One commissioner [Board of Insurance Com-
missioners] declared that he never understood whether the Legislature intended for him
to regulate the insurance or fix maximum charges on the loan."
10 The following writings present various shades of views on credit insurance. Dunbar,
Credit Insurance - Use by Licensed Lenders, 1956 INs. L. J. 443; Mos', Consumer
Installment Credit Insurance, 1956 INS. L.J. 299; Cade, The Fundamental Issues of
Consumer Credit Insurance, 1955 INS. L.J. 76; Mors, Small Loan Laws and Credit Insurance,
1954 INS. L.J. 778; Vernon, Regulated Credit Life and Disability Insurance and the Small
Loan, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111 (1954); Report of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly Legislation, The Tie-in Sale of Credit Insurance in Connection with Small
Loans and other Transactions, S. Doc. No. 57921, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1955). Chrisby,
Credit Life, Health and Acident Insurance and the Small Loan Industry in Indiana,
1954 INs. L.J. 465. But for a record of how it is operating in Texas, the reader is
again referred to Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Board
of Insurance CommissionS, April 3, 1956.
"
1Arts. 342-508, TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. (1947).
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building and loan associations," insurance companies" (other than
those selling credit insurance), pawn brokers," loan brokers or lend-
ing companies, 5 or with cash and time prices in sales of motor
vehicles.'"
In none of these other statutes has the Legislature undertaken to
assert that money received by lenders from borrowers "shall be con-
sidered for all purposes" as something other than interest. There-
fore, assuming all of these other statutes are constitutional, the
further assumption does not necessarily follow, that the Credit
Insurance Act is constitutional.
CONSTITUTION AS SELF-EXECUTING
In order to test the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Credit
Insurance Act, an examination of the pertinent provision of the
Texas Constitution and of the principles that apply to it must be
made. Section 11 of Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas pro-
vides:
All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum per
annum, shall be deemed usurious, and the first Legislature after this
amendment is adopted, shall provide appropriate pains and penalties to
prevent the same; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate
shall not exceed six per centum per annum.
Of first importance is the fact that this section is self-executing
to the extent that it renders all contracts for a greater rate of in-
terest than ten per cent per annum illegal.
In Watson v. Aiken," the Supreme Court considered a case where
a loan was made after the earlier constitutional prohibition against
usury was adopted but before the Legislature had met in its first
session and so had not yet provided for "appropriate pains and
penalties to prevent and punish usury" as required by the Consti-
tution. The court held:
When this loan was made the usury was illegal by virture of the
constitutional prohibition; and although it was left to the legislature
12Arts. 852-881b, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1953).
13 Art. 3.39, TEx. INS. CODE ANN. (1952).
14Arts. 6146-6161, 6165a, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (1949).
"Art. 1524a, TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. (1949), held constitutional in Reams v.
Fianace & Thrift Corp., 236 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Condemned as un-
constitutional in 31 TEXAS L. REv. 345 (1953).
"CArt. 5074a TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
'"Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679 (1894); Watson v. Aiken, 55 Tex. 536 (1881);




to prescribe pains and penalties to prevent and punish usury a contract
for usurious interest was a contract in violation of law. 9
Hemphill v. Watson" confirmed the decision of Watson v. Aiken
and declared that Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution is
self-executing. The loan involved was made after the adoption of
said section, but before the act of August 21, 1876 was passed, which
prescribes certain penalties for usurious contracts.' The lender con-
tended that since the loan was previous to the passage of this act
there was no law against usury in force. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the Constitution made usury a "quasi offense"
which the Legislature was charged with suppressing and punishing.
The court said:
This provision is prohibitory in its nature and self-executing so far
as to render all contracts of the kind immediately illegal; and it left
to the legislature the only remaining duty of saying what penalties
should be imposed upon offenders against this clause of the constitu-
tion."
Watts v. Mann 3 discussed in detail below, confirms the law in these
decisions.
The law is conclusive that the Constitution itself prohibits usury
and makes usurious contracts illegal regardless of legislative action.
And the constitutional prohibition against usury being self-execut-
ing, it is conclusive that the Legislature is powerless to pass a consti-
tutional statute that would make contracts for a greater interest
than 10% per annum legal contracts rather than usurious contracts.
The Legislature is powerless to pass a valid statute attempting to
do this either directly or indirectly. Section 6 of the Credit Insurance
Act is a statute that permits, indirectly, contracts for more than
10% interest per annum.
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF "INTEREST"
Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution is very clear. Its words
are simple and specfic; its meaning and intent apparent. All con-
tracts for more than 10% interest per year are usurious and the
Legislature has the duty to prevent usurious contracts. Section 6
of the Credit Insurance Act says commissions received by lenders
19 55 Tex. at 542.
2o SuPra note 17.
21Ths act is in part our present Art. 5071, TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. (1947),
which prescribes certain penalties for usurious contracts.
2260 Tex. at 681.
2*3 Supra note 17.
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shall not be "interest." The key word is "interest." As will appear,
the only basis on which Section 6 of the Credit Insurance Act could
be constitutional is that the commissions received by the lender can
not constitute "interest." What is "interest?" It is not defined in
the Constitution. But there is no doubt as to its meaning as used in
the Constitution. The Constitution was framed with reference to
the common law, and in judging what the Constitution means in
using an undefined term, the common law definition applies."
"Interest" as known to the common law is defined as "a compensa-
tion usually reckoned by a percentage for the loan, use or for-
bearance of money."2 The common law, at the time of writing
and adoption of the Constitution of 1876 and at the time of its
amendment in 1891 has included in the definition of "interest" any
compensation for the use of money. 6 That this was the essential
element in the definition of "interest" at common law is verified
by the fact that all of the statutes defining interest have included
the fundamental principle that it is compensation for the use of
money. The constitutional meaning of "interest" is therefore pro-
perly defined in our present-day statute." Interest means today what
it meant when the Constitution was adopted. Our Supreme Court
has definitely approved the constitutional principle that the mean-
ing which a constitutional provision had when it was adopted re-
mains fixed. Its intent does not change with time nor with condi-
tions. While it operates upon new subjects and changed conditions,
it operates with the same meaning and interest which it had when
formulated and adopted.
ATTEMPTED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
The constitutional meaning of interest today, as in the past, is
that it is compensation for the use of money. And the Constitution,
by a self-executing declaration, makes usurious all contracts which
yield more interest than 10% per year as compensation for the use
of money. And the Constitution by mandate casts upon the Legis-
lature the duty to prevent such usurious contracts by pains and
24 Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 1, 243 S.W. 778 (1922).
2Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S.W. 322 (1899). The element of "detention"
of money first appeared in Revised Statutes of 1879 so the later constitutional provisions
against usury adopted the element of "detention" in the definition of interest.
21 Ibid.
2 7 Art. 2972, TEX. CirV. STAT. (1879); Art. 3097, TEX. CIv. STAT. (1895); Art. 5069,
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1947).2
sArt. 5069, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (1948).
29 Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 167 S.W.2d 147 (1943); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 76 S.W.2d 1007 (1934).
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penalties."0 Yet in the face of the above, Section 6 of the Credit In-
surance Act has attempted to remove from the meaning of "inter-
est," premiums and commissions for credit insurance which may
be received by the lender from the borrower, in fact and intent,
as compensation for the use of money. It attempts to do this by
saying that such commissions "shall not be taken to be an interest
charge on the money borrowed" and that such commissions "shall
be considered for all purposes as compensation for services rendered
to such insurer." By these words, the Legislature has attempted to
change the constitutional meaning of "interest" contrary to the
constitutional principle that that meaning shall remain the same as
when adopted. By these words, the Legislature has not only at-
tempted to avoid the constitutional mandate to prevent usurious
contracts by pains and penalties; it has actually gone conversely to
such mandate by permitting usurious contracts. These things the
Legislature has no power to do under the Constitution and the law
as declared by the Supreme Court."
In Snyder v. Baird Independent School District, it was stated:
It is insisted that the Legislature and the officers of the state have
construed the Constitution different to our interpretation, therefore
that construction should prevail; but neither the Legislature nor any
officer of the state has the power to annul a provision of the Constitu-
tion and thereby deprive the citizen of this state of the protection
guaranteed to them by that instrument."2
In Cramer v. Sheppard, the Supreme Court declared:
By the adoption of the foregoing amendments to the Constitution
the people of this state clearly expressed their will on this question,
and those who are called upon to construe the Constitution are not
authorized to thwart the will of the people by reading into the
Constitution language not contained therein, or by construing it dif-
ferently from its plain meaning. The people have the sole power to
change or modify the plain language adopted by them. Until that is
done, it remains the supreme law of the land, and should be obeyed."
In Jones v. Ross, the question involved was whether Section 26
of Article XVI of the Constitution, creating an action for exemplary
damages for survivors of one killed by willful act or omission or
gross neglect, was affected by subsequent statutes enacted for the
protection of workmen on buildings. The Supreme Court held that
legislative enactments could not change the constitutional cause of
"Carder v. Knippa Mercantile Co., 1 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
"See Thompson v. Kay, 124 Tex. 252, 77 S.W.2d 201, 214 (1934).
2 102 Tex. 4, 111 S.W. 723, 725 (1908).
"140 Tex. 271, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (1943).
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action and used the following language appropriate to the subject
matter of this article:
It is the settled law of this State that the provisions of our State
Constitution mean what they meant when they were promulgated and
adopted, and their meaning is not different at any subsequent time.
Constitutional provisions must be construed in the light of conditions
existing at the time of adoption, and it does not lie within the power
of the Legislature to change their meaning, or to enact laws in con-
flict therewith. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 75 S.W.2d
1007, 96 A.L.R. 802; Cramer v. Sheppard, Tex. Sup., 167 S.W.2d 147,
It follows that Section 26 of Article 16 of our Constitution only op-
erates to allow exemplary damages for homicide by wilful act or
omission, or gross neglect, in the classes of exemplary damage cases
in existence at the time it was adopted. At such time Articl.-s 1582
and 5182 of our Statutes had never been enacted. They therefore
cannot affect such cases one way or the other."
Actually there are stronger reasons for applying these constitutional
principles to outlaw Section 6, Credit Insurance Act, for not only
is Section 6 in conflict with the meaning of Section 11 of Article
XVI of the Constitution, it is also counter to the duty cast upon
the Legislature by that section of the Constitution, to prevent
usurious contracts by pains and penalties."
This is a legislative attempt to change the clear meaning of the
constitutional provisions on usury. The Legislature can no more set
such provisions aside than it could the constitutional provisions in-
volved in State v. Hatcher"4 which provided that payment under
oil and gas leases on university land should go to the "permanent
university fund." The Legislature passed a statute providing that
such funds should go to the "special building fund." The Supreme
Court held the statute to be void, declaring that neither the Legis-
lature nor the courts can set aside clear constitutional provisions;
the people alone through constitutional amendments have power
to change the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES AND RESTRICTIONS UPON THE LEGISLATURE
There is a further constitutional principle that mitigates against
the validity of Section 6 of the Credit Insurance Act. Our Con-
stitution is not a grant of power by the people to the Legislature,
but operates as a limitation of power whereby all power not limited
by the Constitution inheres in the people, and acts of the Legislature
34 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (1943).
s"Supra note 30.
3115 Tex. 332, 281 S.W. 192 (1926).
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are legal when the Constitution contains no express or implied pro-
hibition against them. 7 Our constitutional provisions are also man-
datory, not merely directory, so it is incumbent on the Legislature,
in exercising its power within the limitations of the mandatory pro-
visions of the Constitution, to enact such legislation as might be
necessary to carry out the purposes set out in such provisions,"0 but
not to enact legislation that is implicitly prohibited by the man-
datory provisions, or contrary to the purposes set out in such
provisions."
Watts v. Mann" is squarely in point. A little history will serve
to give better insight to the meaning of Section 11, Article XVI of
the Constitution as a limitation of power on the Legislature. Prior
to 1943 there was no legislation giving the state power to enjoin
money lenders from charging usurious rates. Nevertheless, the At-
torney General in 1939 filed a civil suit against numerous money
lenders seeking to enjoin them from collecting usurious interest, on
the theory that their activities constituted a public nuisance. The
Supreme Court held that the state did not have the power to enjoin
money lenders from charging usurious rates.41
The basis for the decision was that the constitutional provision
of Section 11 places upon the Legislature the duty to provide ap-
propriate pains and penalties to prevent usury; that the same con-
stitutional provision did not constitute the charging or collection
of interest a nuisance of any kind, much less a public nuisance, and
therefore there was no jurisdiction for an injunction since charging
usurious interest is not a public nuisance. The case was further based
on the fact that the Legislature had provided a penalty for charging
usurious interest under Article 5073 and had also provided that
usurious interest shall be void under Article 5071 and that all rights,
penalties and remedies provided for had been given exclusively to
the borrower and no effort had been made to award the state any
remedies. It was concluded that the court had no power to add to
or take away from such legislative pains, penalties and remedies.
As a direct consequence of that decision, the Legislature in 1943
passed Article 4646b4" (popularly known as the Loan Shark Act)
3
7 Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
38 Hunt v. State, 22 Crim. App. 396, 3 S.W. 233 (1886); San Antonio & A.P. Ry.
Co. v. State, 79 Tex. 264, 14 S.W. 1063 (1891). City of Denison v. Municipal Gas Co.,
257 S.W. 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), aff'd, 117 Tex. 291, 3 S.W.2d 794 (1928).
39Supra notes 28, 30, 32 and 33.
40 187 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
4 Ex parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270 (1939).42 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1956).
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giving the Attorney General and District and County Attorneys the
right to institute suits to enjoin habitual money lenders from con-
tracting for, demanding or receiving usurious interest. Walter Watts
and twenty-nine other money lenders brought a suit against the
Attorney General and others seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Loan Shark Act was invalid and asking an injunction against
its enforcement. The Attorney General by cross-action asked for
the injunctive relief afforded by the Loan Shark Act. Watts et al.
appealed the trial court judgment against them.
Watts attacked the validity of the Loan Shark Act on five differ-
ent grounds, the first of which is the only one important to this
discussion. It was argued that under Section 11, Article XVI of the
Constitution, the Legislature is authorized to prevent usury only
by providing "pains and penalties" which does not include in-
junctions.
The theory advanced was that the constitutional reference to
"pains and penalties" was a grant of power to the Legislature and
that the Legislature could exercise its power only within the exact
words of the grant. Therefore, it was argued, the Legislature could
enact laws prescribing "pains and penalties" exclusively and hence
had no power to pass laws to permit injunctions. The court held,
however, that the Constitution is not a grant of power, but operates
as a limitation of power whereby all power which is not limited by
the Constitution inheres in the people, and the action of the Legis-
lature is legal when the Constitution contains no prohibition, ex-
press or implied, against it. It was concluded that Section 11 of
Article XVI imposed no inhibitions against the enactment of the
Loan Shark Act since there was no prohibition, expressed or im-
plied, against permitting injunctions to prevent usury as well as
other "pains and penalties." Such use of injunctions clearly follows
the intention of the Constitution that the Legislature prevent and
penalize usurious contracts.
The clear and definite basis for the holding in Watts v. Mann is
that Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution operates as a limita-
tion of power on the Legislature under which the Legislature can
pass a valid statute giving the state injunctive powers to prevent
usury, there being no constitutional prohibition expressed or implied
against such means to prevent usury. Further, the statute tends to
carry out the expressed purpose of the Constitution that the Legis-
lature pass laws to prevent usury. Implicit in the holding is that
there is a constitutional prohibition against the Legislature passing a
[Vol. I1I
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statute that will permit usury rather than prevent it contrary to
the expressed purpose of the Constitution.
That the Legislature cannot restrict the constitutional mandate
to prevent usury in any way is exemplified by Dunman v. Harrison,"'
where it was argued by the lender that what is now Article 5071,
in using the term "written contracts," meant that only written
contracts for more than 10% interest were usurious and therefore
the contract involved, being partly written and partly oral, was
not usurious. The court rejected this argument because the Consti-
tution applies to all contracts, so if the statute restricted the con-
stitutional declaration to written contracts "the restrictive feature
of the statute should be held to be in violation of the more com-
prehensive and emphatic declaration of the constitution.""
EFFECT OF SECTION 6
Section 6 declares that commissions received by lenders "shall be
considered for all purposes as compensation for services rendered to
such insurer and shall not be taken to be an interest charge on the
money borrowed." (emphasis supplied) This forecloses any inquiry
as to whether the credit insurance is written for the bona fide pur-
pose of giving security to the lender or for the illegal purpose of
securing additional interest beyond that allowed by the Constitution
for the use of money. Even though such lender swears under oath
that he is by this means extracting usurious interest, Section 6 says
it is not interest but it is "for all purposes" compensation for services
rendered to the credit insurance company. Even though it be proved
as an unquestioned fact that thousands of small loan lenders in
Texas receive millions of dollars each year' in the form of credit
insurance commissions for the illegal purpose of securing additional
compensation beyond that allowed by the Constitution, Section 6
says these millions of dollars "shall not be taken to be an interest
charge on the money borrowed" and it declares that these millions
of dollars "shall be considered for all purposes as compensation for
services rendered" to the credit insurer. This analysis reveals that
Section 6 has the effect of saying that black is white; that bad is
"41 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
4441 S.W. at 500.
41 Premiums reported to the Board of Insurance Commissioners are set out in "Texas
Earned Premiums and Paid Losses for Credit Life, Health and Accident Insurance, Five
Years Experience Ending December 31, 1955," Exhibit A to Transcript of Proceedings,
Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, April 3, 1956, as follows: 1951: $4,103,695;
1952: $10,593,865; 1953: $12,333,266; 1954: $16,263,202, and 1955: $22,513,464 - a
total of the five years of $65,807.592. The paid losses for the five years were $5,642,969,
for a loss ratio of 13.2%.
19 57]
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good; that interest is not interest. It thus seems beyond question
that Section 6 is patently unconstitutional because it attempts to
make contracts for a greater rate of interest than 10% per annum
legal by declaring certain compensation not interest, which in fact
and under the Constitution is interest.
Section 6 further provides that should such commissions "be in
excess of any maximum fixed hereunder, then such commissions
shall be deemed to be an interest charge on the money borrowed."
Under this provision, the maximum commission could be fixed so
high-or not fixed at all-that the lender could extract well over
the 10% interest allowed by the Constitution and yet not exceed
the maximum.
In actual practice, the latter situation exists, for the Board of
Insurance Commissioners has never fixed a maximum charge for
commissions. A lender can receive 100% of the premiums as com-
missions and such commissions would not be excessive under the
Credit Insurance Act and the regulations as they now stand. The
usual commission retained by the small loan lender is 85% of the
premiums." There can be no argument that the lender's main pur-
pose in retaining said commission is to secure more compensation for
the use of his money. 7 And although such commission is in addition
to the 10% interest the lender also charges, such commission, not
being in excess of a nonexistent maximum, can't "be deemed to be
an interest charge on the money borrowed" under Section 6. So
again Section 6, along with the nonaction of the Board of Insurance
Commissioners, has the effect of declaring that which is in fact
interest, not interest.
Section 6, in declaring "shall be considered for all purposes as
compensation for services rendered to such insurer and shall not be
taken to be an interest charge on the money borrowed" (emphasis
supplied), is in effect an attempt to refute the many decisions and
assertions by the Texas courts that in deciding whether the loan
"6 A typical case reflecting proof of such percentage of commissions is Advance Loan
Service v. Mandick, No. 78519-C, 68th District Court, Dallas (now pending appeal),
where the records of Home Life & Accident Ins. Co. were introduced. See also Ware v. Pax-
ton, 266 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e. See testimony of James
Donhain, Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Sept. 4, 1951,
p. 43.
V Authorities cited notes 6 and 46 supra, and jury findings of lenders' purposes in the
following cases: Clanton v. Community Finance & Thrift Corp., 262 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953); Ware v. Wright, 266 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ware v.
Paxton, 266 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Industrial Finance
Service Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error granted.
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was usurious, the courts will disregard the form and look to the
substance of the transaction."
Likewise, it refutes the many decisions that all devices conjured
by lenders to conceal usury will be disregarded. 9 Further, it refutes
the many decisions that the courts look to the intentions,"0 because
the intent to take usury constitutes the offense."'
Section 6 would seem to preclude the submission to the jury of
a special issue as to whether credit insurance premiums were charged
to the borrower for the purpose of obtaining usury.
Section 6 of the Credit Insurance Act also has the effect of attempt-
ing to refute those decisions which take the realistic view of the trans-
actions involved and if it is found that the contracts, business arrange-
ments and practices constitute a mere disguise under ostensible legal
forms to conceal the business of charging and collecting usurious in-
terest, the element of the actual intent of the parties is not essential."
Proof of actual intent is no more essential under these circumstances
than it is where the loan contract on its face expressly shows that more
than the legal rate of interest is being charged.' The law laid down in
the cases supporting the above statement is especially applicable to the
tie-in sales of credit insurance with small loans. Such transactions are
strictly analogous to the "tie-in" of required brokerage or bonus ar-
48 Graham & Locke Investment Co. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Autocredit of Ft. Worth, Inc., v. Pritchett, 223 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949) error dism.; Schmid v. City National Bank, 132 Tex. 115, 114 S.W.2d
854 (1938); and cases cited in 42 TEx. JUR., Usury §8 (1936).
"'Glenn v. McCarty, 130 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), aff'd, 137 Tex. 608,
155 S.W.2d 912 (1941); Glover v. Bushman, 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error
dism.; Standard Supply and Hardware Co. v. Christian-Carpenter Drilling Co., 183 S.W.2d
657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref.; and cases cited in 42 TEX. Jua., Usury §8, note
19 (1936).
50 Graham & Locke Investments v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956)error ref. m.r.e.; Temple Trust Co. v. Sewell, 133 Tex. 417, 126 S.W.2d 943 (1939);
and cases cited in 42 TEX. JUR., Usury §8, note 19 (1936).
" Henry v. Sanson, 21 S.W. 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893); Walker v. Temple Trust Co.,
124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935); and cases cited 42 TEx. JUR., Usury §18, note
15 (1936).
"But apparently such an issue was permitted in Industrial Finance Service Co. v.
Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error granted.
'Sledge v. Murphy, 284 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Donoghue v. State, 211
S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Federal Mortgage Co. v. State Nat.
Bank of Corsicana, 254 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error dism.; Joy v. Provi-
dent Loan Society, 37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Commerce Trust
Co. v. Best, 54 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), judgment reformed and aff'd,
124 Tex. 583, 80 S.W.2d 942 (1935). And see Graham & Lock Investments v. Madison,
295 S.W.2d 234, 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
"Hemphill v. Watson, 60 Tex. 679 (1894); Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex.
575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935); Joy v. Provident Loan Society, 37 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) error dism.
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rangements," coupon arrangements," collateral contract arrange-
ments,"7 and investment certificate arrangements, " all of which have
been struck down when the facts revealed that the arrangements re-
sulted in the lenders receiving a greater compensation than 10% per
annum for the use of their money.
STATISTICS SHOWING INTENT
Official figures issued by the Board of Insurance Commissioners of
earned premiums and paid losses for credit life, health and accident
insurance for five years ending December 31, 1955, are very reveal-
ing. 9 These are the companies' own figures as reported to the
Board of Insurance Commissioners. They indicate quite conclusively
that the purpose of most lenders in writing credit insurance is not for
the security of their loan but for the added compensation obtained
thereby.
During 1951 and 1952 the Board set the highest maximum rate
for premiums to be charged for health and accident insurance on the
"6 day retroactive" policy. Consequently almost all health and acci-
dent policies written by the lenders were the "6 day retroactive"
policies.
In 1951 out of $3,545,716 in premiums reported for writing health
and accident policies, $3,032,524 was for the "6 day retroactive" type.
This amounts to 85.53 % of the total.
In 1952 out of $8,774,559 in premiums for health and accident
policies, $7,697,350 was for the "6 day retroactive" type, or 87.72%
of the total.
In 1953 out of $9,438,686 in health and accident premiums $7,701,-
089 was for "6 day retroactive," or 81.59o of the total.
On December 2, 1952, new regulations were issued setting forth
maximum premium rates to be charged for credit insurance, and these
regulations provided that "3 day retroactive" health and accident
policies could also contain hospitalization and confinement benefits
with the right to charge higher premiums for such benefits. "° These
"'Donoghue v. State, 211 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
'6 Glover v. Buchman, 104 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
"Waxahachie Loan & Trust Co. v. Turner, 74 S.W. 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
"SCitizens Industrial Bank of Austin v. Schmidt, 112 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) error dism.
" Exhibit A, supra note 45.
60 Official Minutes of Meeting, Board of Insurance Commissioners, Austin, Texas, Dec.
2, 1952. This regulation itself may be illegal under Sec. 5 of the Texas Credit Insurance
Act, which permits only one policy of life and one policy of health and accident in-
surance, or both, on one loan. See Hartridge v. Home Life & Accident Ins. Co., 246
S.W.2d 666, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
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regulations permitted lenders to charge the highest premiums for "3
day retroactive" instead of "6 day retroactive." These regulations
did not become effective until March 1, 1953, and consequently the
lenders could not take advantage of their provisions during 1953.
In 1954 out of a total of $11,088,263 in health and accident
premiums, $9,265,273 was for the writing of "3 day retroactive."
Thus the now highest maximum premium, "3 day retroactive," com-
prised 83.56% of the total premiums collected, while the former
highest premium insurance had dropped to only 3.84% of the total.
In 1955 out of a total of $14,614,850 in health and accident
premiums, $12,774,266 was for the "3 day retroactive" policies, for
87.41 7 of the total, while the "6 day retroactive policies amounted
to only $616,286 for a percentage of 4.22%o of the total.
There can be little doubt that most of the lenders followed the
practice of arbitrarily writing the insurance for which they could
charge the highest premium and thereby secure the greatest com-
pensation. Security for the loan cannot be the intent of such lenders.
Why were they more secured in their loans in 1951, 1952, and 1953
with "6 day retroactive" insurance rather than "3 day retroactive"
insurance, and then more secured in their loans in 1954 and 1955
with "3 day retroactive" insurance rather than "6 day retroactive"
insurance? The necessitous borrower would not invariably purchase
on his own volition the insurance that cost him the most.
The figures for the five-year period are also very significant with
regard to the amounts of premiums received for "level life" credit
insurance and the premiums received for "reducing life" credit in-
surance. If security of the loan was really the purpose of the lender
in selling credit life insurance, a reducing life credit insurance policy
would give him complete security, and in the case of the necessitous
borrowers of small loans it would seem that the lender would want to
write such a policy for him, since it costs only half as much as the
"level life" insurance policy. However, throughout the five-year
period premiums collected for "level life" policies have been con-
sistently and substantially greater than those for "reducing life."'"
That added compensation for the use of their money is the real
motive of the lenders is also revealed by the loss ratio figures. In-
variably the lowest loss ratio each year during the five-year period
is on the type insurance for which the highest premiums were
charged. In 1951 the loss ration for "6 day retroactive" insurance was
12.99%; in 1952 it was 8.78%; in 1953 it was 7.93%. In 1954 the
8" Exhibit A, supra note 45.
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loss ratio for "3 day retroactive" insurance was 8.20% and in 1955
it was 8.84%." This low loss ratio also explains how the small loan
offices are able to retain 85 % of the premiums as commissions and
the credit insurance companies, even those who do not own the loan
company, are still able to make a profit.
The official records of the Board of Insurance Commissioners also
reveal the admitted purpose behind the Credit Insurance Act as ex-
pressed by Frank Cain, a strong sponsor and vigorous defender of
the act. Mr. Cain stated to the Board:
Now, what has come about is simply this, had to make a choice,
couldn't go before the people of Texas and we have got a constitution
I would never advocate be changed, too many abuses when you don't
have a constitutional limitation on interest (sic). So, as we came along
here, here was a means by which we could give the people of Texas
a loan insurance properly regulated at a rate where the yield through
the commission to the lending agent together with the interest that
he charged would not exceed that which is recommended by everybody
as not being more than 40 per cent. And that we would still be giving
the people of Texas something for their money and yet providing a
means for keeping the independent lending agent in business. (Empha-
sis supplied)."
The real purpose behind this act is emphasized by the following
question by former Insurance Commissioner Paul B. Brown and Mr.
Cain's answer thereto:
[Commissioner Brown] Well now, isn't this scheme of this credit
insurance partially lying behind the fact that the lender can't make
enough money at 10 per cent and he wants to get a high rate com-
mission paid on insurance so he can get the insurance instead of lend-
ing money?
[Mr. Cain] No, sir. Let me say this, it is a universally recognized
thing, uncontroverted, that you cannot loan money of $250.00 on
down for any 10 per cent simple interest and stay in business. Nobody
can do that, not even the great Household Finance Corporation. Either
depart from the constitution prohibition or got to supplement that
income with something. That is logical, beneficial and a welfare to the
public itself, and that's what a credit insurance is."
SIMILAR ARKANSAS ACT HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The case of Stricker v. State Auto Finance Co.," decided by the
62 Ibid.
63 Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing on Credit Insurance, Board of Insurance
Commissioners, Austin, Texas, Sept. 4, 1951, p. 36. Frank Cain's law firm has represented
small loan lenders and he formerly was chairman of the board of one of the largest
credit insurance companies in Texas.
"I bid at 39.
65220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952).
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Supreme Court of Arkansas, substantiates the analysis and conclusions
reached in this article. Arkansas has a constitutional prohibition
against usury similar to that of Texas." In 1951 the Arkansas Legis-
lature passed the "Arkansas Installment Loan Law""7 which autho-
rized lenders to make and collect certain service charges and collect
premiums from borrowers for credit life and credit health and acci-
dent insurance as additional profit on loans. The court ruled un-
constitutional those sections of the act purporting to authorize the
collection of charges of more than 10% per annum, regardless of
the definition given or the label attached to the particular charge by
the Legislature. The following observations by the court are par-
ticularly pertinent to the subject matter of this article:
It is further provided in subsection (c) that "such charges shall
not be considered to be interest or compensation for the use or forbear-
ance or detention of money." Contracts including this and similar
provisions have been repeatedly condemned by this court as ineffectual
devices to evade the Constitution ....
When these sections are considered [together] there arises in our
opinion a legislative intent to authorize the collection of more than 10
per cent interest in violation of the Constitution. Even if we are wrong
in this conclusion and there was only the intent to allow charges that
have been approved by this court, still these sections would so handi-
cap a necessitous borrower as to render impotent his constitutional
right to invalidate as usurious a contract made pursuant to the Act.
The Constitution directs the enactment of laws to prohibit, and not
to permit, usury. The invalidity penalty is designed to protect bor-
rowers from imposition and usurious oppression at the hands of
rapacious lenders. An attempt by the Legislature to take from the
borrower this constitutional shield is just as effective as a direct
authorization to the lender to make usurious charges in the first
instance. While the Act is ingeniously drawn, the fact remains that the
above-mentioned subsections would nullify rights of a borrower which
the framers of our fundamental law intended to preserve.8
The Court then discussed the credit insurance aspect as follows:
We next consider the insurance charges of $28.20. The evidence
disclosed that these charges, as well as the $24 service charge, were
made after consultation and advice with those officials who sponsored
Act 203 and are charged with its enforcement. Appellee's insurance
operations were fully sanctioned as being authorized by and in con-
formity with §27(f) of the Act. Although appellant apparently
66 ARK. CONST. art. 19, S 13 provides: "All contracts for a greater rate of interest than
ten percent per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and the General As-
sembly shall prohibit the same by law; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the
rate shall be ix per centum per annum."6 7 ARK. STAT. ANN. §51301-37 (Supp. 1951).
a' 249 S.W.2d at 312, 313.
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furnished ample security for the loan by a mortgage on her house-
hold furniture, which could have been insured for a small premium,
she was required to purchase both life and health policies which she
did not want, or need, and which she could ill afford to purchase. We
cannot agree with appellee's contention that this requirement repre-
sents a proper charge made under a valid collateral agreement ...
Section 35 of Act 203 attempts to authorize registrants to receive
commissions on insurance premiums as a profit on a loan in addition to
the various other charges authorized by the Act. The facts in the
instant case demonstrate the abuses that are bound to arise when such
authority is exercised by a lender in connection with the further
authority to require life and health insurance in all cases under §27 (f)
without regard to the needs of the borrower. We conclude that the
insurance charges made in this case were usurious and unauthorized
under the Constitution and that said §535 and 27(f) are invalid inso-
far as they purport to validate such charges."
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Does the Texas Credit Insurance Act "legalize usury"? The answer
is no. But it attempts to do so. The answer is no because our Con-
stitution contains a self-executing mandatory prohibition against
usury; therefore the Legislature has no power to "legalize" usury in
any manner. Section 6 of the Texas Credit Insurance Act attempts
to legalize usury by indirectly changing the constitutional meaning
of "interest" in such a way as to permit usury. Such attempt is un-
constitutional because the Legislature has no power to so change the
meaning of interest; it has the mandatory duty to prevent usury and
consequently is prohibited from permitting usury by any indirect
means. Any argument that the Legislature has the constitutional
power to change the meaning of interest as has been attempted by
Section 6 of the Texas Credit Insurance Act, must necessarily lead
to the indefensible conclusion that the Legislature has the power to
nullify Section 11, Article XVI of the Constitution. It is the writer's
opinion, based on collateral research in writing this article, that
Texas is in desperate need of a comprehensive, modern and effective
small loan law. But it is also the writer's opinion, based on the obvious
conclusions to be drawn from the analysis made in this article, that
there must be a constitutional amendment of Section 11, Article
XVI in order for such small loan law to be valid.
For all Texans who are interested in our small loan problems and
especially for those who have the responsibility of carrying out the
will of the citizens of Texas as expressed in the constitutional pro-
vision on usury, the following is quoted from United States Senator
60249 S.W.2d at 313.
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William Langer's subcommittee report on "The Tie-in Sale of Credit
Insurance in Connection With Small Loans and Other Transactions":
To those individuals who abhor the thought of Federal interference
with the business of insurance, who desire the continued regulation of
the industry by the several States, the subcommittee has this final
admonition:
This subcommittee will not allow itself to be blinded by subterfuge.
Neither will it turn a deaf ear to those of our citizenry opporessed by
the coercive practices related in this report. The citizens of Kansas
and the other several States likewise are citizens of the United
States. While these abuses here related continue, this subcommittee will
not forever accept "attempts" at regulation as a substitute for regula-
tion of the business of insurance by the States. The patience of the
Federal Government with those who would abuse the good name of
insurance some day may come to an end. *
0 S. Doc. No. 57921, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (195).
* The author acknowledges with appreciation assistance in the form of a research grant
from the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
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